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Abstract 
The topic of this paper is the significance of EU issues in domestic political discourses in Central Europe be-
fore and after EU enlargement. It focuses in particular on Poland. Poland is a critical case, not only because it is 
the largest of the new EU member states, but also because it is characterized by what presents itself as an in-
triguing paradox: although levels of support for EU membership among the population have generally been 
high, there has been, since the early 2000s, a growing divergence of views on EU membership among political 
mobilizers. Moreover, the rise of anti-EU rhetoric appears to coincide with the resurgence of nationalist poli-
tics. In 2005, a conservative nationalist party called Law and Justice (PiS) won the elections with a moderately 
Euroskeptic program and formed a government with two radical anti-EU parties in April 2006. Positions on 
Europe were also a topic in the 2007 elections that led to the defeat of the incumbent government parties. This 
paper asks two questions: What are the domestic political uses of anti-EU discourse for self-described centrist 
parties such as Law and Justice (PiS)? And what is the connection between anti-EU discourse and nationalism? 
The paper argues that domestic views on European integration in Poland are to be understood as the expres-
sion of a changing balance between a deeply held conviction and a strategic position related to the context of 
domestic political competition. It argues that, since 2001, centrist political actors have mainly used anti-EU rhe-
toric to serve purposes that relate to the domain of domestic political competition. They could deemphasize 
their deep normative commitment to European integration because EU membership had already been secured. 
Finally, the paper shows how domestic political competitors in Poland have intentionally conflated pro- and 
anti-EU rhetoric with a discussion on commitments to the “truthful” representation of the nation. Introduction1 
 
During almost the entire decade of the 1990s the most successful mainstream political actors in Po-
land had a favorable view of the European integration process and were generally supportive of the idea that 
the country needed to become a member of the EU as soon as possible. During the 1995 campaign for the 
presidency, for example, Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Lech Kaczyński all mentioned EU mem-
bership as a crucial foreign policy goal even though they represented very different political camps and ideo-
logical preferences (party programs in Słodkowska 2003). In parliamentary elections, too, post-Communist 
left-wing politicians, post-Solidarity moral conservatives as well as pro-business neo-liberals all argued in favor 
of EU accession. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 1997, for example, we find positive refer-
ences to the EU in electoral programs of the incumbent Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (Słodkowska and 
Dołbakowska 2004:115-135), its main (and successful) conservative contender Solidarity Election Action 
(AWS) (Słodkowska and Dołbakowska 2004: 99-102), and all the smaller parties that could secure parliamen-
tary representation. Even the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the nationalist Movement for the Reconstruction 
of Poland (ROP) included viewpoints suggesting that progress towards EU accession was basically self-evident.  
 
To be sure, one of the notable things in the campaign material of the 1990s is that parties and candi-
dates reserved very little space to discuss and explain the positive value of EU accession. Their endorsement 
of the EU was sometimes expressed as an explicit part of their foreign policy program, but almost as often it 
was a more or less tacit assumption, hidden in general remarks made about policymaking in Poland and the 
state of the country. Yet the unobtrusiveness of the subject in the electoral campaigning of that time does not 
need to be an indication of its perceived unimportance. The fact that EU membership was apparently not 
considered a topic that needed further elaboration may even perhaps serve as evidence of its pervasiveness as 
a basic, underlying policy preference among a wide range of political actors. 
 
The twenty-first century, however, has, so far, seen a very different political discussion on this topic. 
Since the early 2000s, a number of political parties have given more prominence to standpoints that are critical 
of the EU. Radical anti-EU voices gained unprecedented salience as two extremist parties achieved parliamen-
tary representation in 2001. But even more importantwas a perceptual change in the discourse on European 
affairs within parties that sought to be mainstream catch-all parties. In its 2005 campaign Law and Justice 
(PiS), the party of Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, argued that further European integration fostered centraliz-
ing tendencies that would threaten Polish identity (PiS Program 2005: 9). Law and Justice (PiS) became suc-
cessful as a party with a program that combined conservative Catholicism, nationalism, distrust of the uncon-
trolled free market, anti-corruption and strict lustration. In 2006, the party formed a government with the two 
radical parties in parliament: Samoobrona (Self-defense), the outrageous anti-establishment party of Andrzej 
Lepper mainly known for its roadblocks against capitalism, its populist strategies towards farmers and its view 
of European integration as catastrophic for Polish agriculture, and the League of Polish Families (LPR), a 
fringe party representing the radically nationalist, conservative and extreme Catholic right. The anti-EU image 
of the Law and Justice-led government attracted increased international attention when, in the context of the 
June 2007 Summit dealing with the constitutional treaty prime minister, Jarosław Kaczyński wielded refer-
ences to German aggression against Poland in the Second World War in an attempt to obstruct the new EU 
“double majority” voting system in the Council, a tactical gesture that was widely interpreted as anti-
European.2  
                                                 
1This paper was first presented at the conference “The European Union after Enlargement: Policies and Politics in a 
New Context,” European Union Center of Excellence, University of Washington, Seattle, May 1-3, 2008. I thank the par-
ticipants in this conference for their comments and suggestions. This paper represents work in progress and forms a part 
of a larger research project on resurgent nationalism in contemporary Poland. I welcome any comments and thoughts. 
2Kaczyński argued that Poland would have had a much larger population if the Germans had not attacked the country. 
The double majority voting formula is based on population size (55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of 
the EU population) and reduces Poland’s voting clout acquired in the Nice Treaty. Poland opposed the new regulation 
and, in the context of the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty in October 2007, managed to postpone its application until 
2014. An additional transition period until 2017 is foreseen. After that date extra provisions (known as the the Ioannina  
In addition, the self-described pro-EU contenders of Law and Justice at the parliamentary elections of 
2005 and 2007 sometimes relied on a discourse that was far more outspoken in its criticism of the EU than 
anything that was seen during the 1990s. In 2003, the neo-liberal and pro-business party Civic Platform (PO) 
sought to capitalize on the inconsistencies in Law and Justice’s views on Europe by developing a more nation-
alist and patriotic position on the EU, including its own defense of the Nice voting provisions (Szczerbiak 
2007: 6). Although the Civic Platform did not want to be seen as a Euroskeptic party, its campaign in 2005 at 
least did not seek a radical alteration of Poland’s position as a critical and “awkward partner” (Grabbe 2004) in 
the EU.  
 
Significantly, opinion surveys suggest that such an increasing EU criticism within Polish domestic po-
litical party campaigning since 2000 has not been accompanied by growing levels of Euroskepticism among 
the broader public (Szczerbiak 2007). In other words, the surge of political Euroskepticism is probably not so-
cially rooted. Euroskeptic parties received more votes in 2001 and in 2005, but in both elections the overall 
turnout was extremely low, indicating that EU-criticism was not a particularly strong element in helping bring-
ing people to the polls. In the run-up to the 2003 referendum on EU accession, the worry of the government 
was not that not enough people would be in favor of accession, but rather that the turnout would be too low 
to make the result of the referendum valid (in the end turnout was 58.85 percent of the eligible voters; 77.45 
percent voted in favor and 22.55 percent against accepting accession) (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 
2004: 1111). 
 
The questions that lie at the heart of this paper are: What are the domestic political uses of anti-EU 
discourse for self-described centrist parties such as Law and Justice (PiS)? And, since there seems to be some 
sort of correlation between the two phenomena, what is the connection between anti-EU discourse and na-
tionalism? 
 
My argument is twofold. First, I argue that domestic views on European integration in Poland are to 
be understood as the expression of a changing balance between a deeply held conviction and a strategic posi-
tion related to the context of domestic political competition. I argue that, since 2001, centrist political actors 
have mainly used anti-EU rhetoric to serve purposes that relate to the domain of domestic political competi-
tion. They could focus on such short-term strategic goals (and deemphasize their deep normative commitment 
to European integration) because, by that time, EU membership had been more or less secured. The Euro-
skeptic discourses that have gained increased prominence in Poland since 2001 should, therefore, not be seen 
as the reflection of a growing political dissatisfaction with the entire European integration project, but as the 
by-product of a domestically oriented rhetorical struggle between mainstream political contenders in a chang-
ing and unstable party system in which left- and right-wing positions are still rather unspecified.  
 
Second, since “left” and “right” have remained unspecified categories in Polish politics, the rhetorical 
struggle about European integration has been deliberately conflated with discussions that revolved around 
other dividing categorizations. A number of parties, most prominently Law and Justice (PiS), have attempted 
to make national identity (expressed in a defense of traditional values, national material interest, and strict vet-
ting procedures) a central political dividing line. Ideas about EU membership and the country’s position with-
in the EU have been made part of this new political discourse of nationhood. Some politicians have hoped to 
use it in order to carve out a clear position for themselves against their political opponents. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it offers some context and background through a brief explora-
tion of the existing literature on the connection between ideological commitments and party positions on 
European integration in the western part of the EU. Second, it compares party positions on EU integration in 
Poland before and after the accession of 2004 and shows how these positions have increasingly been used 
within the domain of domestic political competition. The empirical analysis is based on party programs and 
                                                                                                                                                              
clause) will make it easier for smaller countries to block a decision. On April 2, 2008, the Polish parliament ratified the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
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public party positions. Quotes in this paper come from this primary material and are my translations.3 Third, it 
explores the extent to which there is an overlap between certain views on European integration and particular 
positions in the debate on nationhood politics in Poland. 
 
1. Party positions on European integration in the Western part of the EU 
 
Before going deeper into the Polish case, it is useful to explore the broader literature dealing with the 
topic. What have researchers said about the political uses of anti-EU discourse in Western Europe? And is 
there in Western Europe a connection between nationalism and anti-EU rhetoric? 
 
With regard to the first question, most of the research concludes that there is an ideological basis for 
anti- and pro-EU standpoints. Aspinwall, for example, found that, in the western part of the EU, “the location 
of parties and governments in a Left–Right space serves as a good independent explanation of preferences on 
integration” (Aspinwall 2002: 82). Other research roughly points to the same conclusions (see, e.g., Marks and 
Hooghe 2006). Centrist parties are generally in favor of European integration; the architects of European inte-
gration have usually been among them, and they generally seem to be inclined to agree with a reduction of na-
tional state power within the European context. Extreme parties, on the other hand, both those on the right 
and the left of the political spectrum, tend to be critical of European integration and in some cases even seek 
to reverse the integration process. 
 
  Moving away from the purely economic left-right dimension, one might ask if nationalism, both in its 
more radical and moderate forms, is also a good indicator of a party’s position on European integration in 
Western Europe. That certainly seems to be the case with radical parties. Not only because of their radical po-
sition on a left-right ideological spectrum do they oppose Europe, but also because their narrative of Europe 
fits within the radical master frame that these parties use: the frame that considers the protection of the imag-
ined unity of the nation as a predominant policy option. On the basis of expert surveys, Marks and Hooghe 
(2006) conclude that in Western Europe there is a strong correlation between a political party’s adherence to 
traditional, authoritarian and nationalist values and its view on European integration. Often anti-immigrant 
parties are anti-European parties and oppose European integration for the same reason that they oppose im-
migration: because it regards growth in the number of foreigners as a threat to the national community.  
 
Yet, while anti-EU views are most salient in the case of extreme nationalist parties, there seems more 
ambivalence when nationalist parties are less radical. When it concerns more centrist parties, nationalism in 
Western Europe does not seem to be such a clear predictor of party positions on European integration. Mod-
erate right- or left-wing parties, with a slight tendency towards traditional, authoritarian and nationalist values 
are not always that outspokenly critical of the European integration project. Regionalist and nationalist minor-
ity movements, for example, may even be very much in favor of the European integration project, at least 
when they do not hold an extreme position on immigrants. The Flemish nationalist party in Belgium (the New 
Flemish Alliance, N-VA), to name just one striking example, argues against the existence of Belgium as a state 
by relying on the classical nationalist argument that “their” nation (the Flemish nation) is a more “natural” en-
tity with objectively knowable borders that should coincide with an independent Flemish state. But their 
nationalism does not stand in the way of a relatively stark pro-EU attitude, since they believe that a certain 
form of European integration could be beneficial in bringing about Flemish independence. These Flemish na-
tionalists have traditionally relied on culturalist reasoning to support particular aspects of the European inte-
gration project. For example, they welcomed the monetary union not because of any belief in its intrinsic value 
for the European economy but because of their belief that it would protect Flanders (not Belgium) against the 
risks of globalization (Beyers and Kerremans 2001). 
                                                 
3I have used the party campaign material collected by the Instytut Studiów Politycznych of the Polish Academy of Scien-
ces in Warsaw. I relied on the Institute’s archives in Warsaw and on the following Institute publications: Paszkiewicz 
(1996), Skłodowska (2001a), Skłodowska (2001b), Skłodowska (2003), Skłodowska and Dołbakowska (2002), Skłodow-
ska and Dołbakowska  (2004), and Skłodowska and Dołbakowska (2006). I also thank the Institute for hosting me for 
desk research in their archive in the late spring of 2007. 
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According to Keating (2004), European integration has provided a new discursive space within which 
to project nationality claims. For that reason, one can find other political parties across Western Europe em-
phasizing a greater form of independence within an international context that has fundamentally changed the 
nature of the national state. These “counter-state nationalists,” as Brubaker calls them (Brubaker 1999) may 
have held diverse views on how intergovernmental or supranational the EU should become, but they have in 
general been supportive of the European integration project because it is seen as leading to a diminishing of 
state control over regions and an increased externalization of competences and functions that were previously 
centralized at the level of the state. Even traditional radicalized left-wing opponents of European integration 
among the nationalist regionalists in Western Europe, such as the Galician and the Breton movements, have 
come to seen the EU in a more favorable light thanks to a gradual shift of the emphasis in the European inte-
gration discourse towards more social solidarity (Keating 2004: 371). 
 
In sum, the picture in Western Europe is that radical parties tend to be critical of EU integration, 
among them radical nationalists. Moderate counter-state nationalists, on the other hand, are often pro-
European, as are minority nationalists. 
 
In postcommunist Central Europe the picture is roughly similar, but not entirely. What is similar is 
that radical parties on the left and the right of the economic ideological perspective tend to be against Euro-
pean integration. Moreover, as in Western Europe, radical nationalists, both those who seek to support the ex-
isting borders of the state and those who want to homogenize the putative national population or “protect” 
that population from growing ethnic heterogeneity, are very often suspicious of any efforts towards European 
integration. And particular regional nationalists in Central Europe, such as the Silesians, or national minority 
movements, such as the Hungarians outside of Hungary, may have expressed themselves politically in favor of 
the European integration project in the hope that it will improve their position as minority groups. 
 
What seems different in Central Europe, however, is that there have been a number of important self-
described centrist parties that make use of nationalist arguments and take a critical and self-protective view in 
matters of European integration, but do not completely reject the European integration project in the same 
way radical parties would do. In Poland, the party that would fit such a description is the Law and Justice (PiS) 
party. At some points in time, the Civic Platform (PO) – although it has not used nationalist arguments in the 
same way Law and Justice has done – may have fallen into that category, too. Parties in other countries that at 
certain points in time would have fit that description would be the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech 
Republic and the Christian Democratic Party (KDH) in Slovakia. 
 
How should we interpret this group of nationalist-oriented centrist parties? There is some discussion 
in the literature about whether they are really opponents of the EU or whether their opposition is rather just an 
empty political gesture. Should their position on the EU be seen as a deeply held and ideologically based view, 
or is it rather the reflection of a short term political strategy? 
 
Their position is comprehensible, I argue, when we pay greater attention to the way these parties 
themselves have framed their EU-related standpoints. I believe their EU-related arguments communicate dif-
ferent things at the same time and that by untangling those things we might get a better understanding of what 
the dynamics of their EU criticism precisely are. It seems to me that in analyzing party positions on EU mat-
ters within the party programs of these parties we have to be aware of two important properties of these posi-
tions. 
 
First, we might get a better understanding of the mechanism at work when we consider EU-related 
opinions in the party programs as narratives that not always relate to the same dimension of European integra-
tion. Within these narratives a distinction should be made between those that talk about EU integration as a 
normative goal and those that see EU integration as a political practice.  
 
Second, their positions become more comprehensible if we realize that EU-related arguments can be 
used in order to perform different functions. They might be used to communicate a party ideology, but they 
may simultaneously be used to carve out a position in the domestic political configuration. Depending on the 
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needs created by particular domestic circumstances, parties might find it more useful to emphasize either the 
normative or the pragmatic dimension of EU integration.  
 
If seen in this perspective, EU-related arguments and domestic party positions on European integra-
tion will be more accurately understood as the result of a changing balance between a deeply held conviction 
and a strategic position related to the context of domestic political competition. Parties might have similar 
views on goal and practice (either negative or positive), or they may have different views on these two dimen-
sions. They might choose to emphasize one or the other, but they always hold views on both dimensions at 
the same time.  
 
When there is a difference, and when they emphasize the negative consequences of EU integration as 
a political practice (and deemphasize the normative dimension), then, my hypothesis is, they usually do so for 
reasons related to short-term strategy, not to the underlying ideology of their party. They will do so more eas-
ily when there is certainty about the long-term prospects of European integration because then the potential 
risk is lower that a short-term strategic standpoint that is critical of EU integration will also be understood as a 
complete rejection of the EU project.  
 
Since the time that the Central European countries have been able to guarantee membership, centrist 
parties that are in principle not against EU integration as a normative goal have increasingly tended to empha-
size arguments that are related to (and critical of) the political practice of European integration. 
 
In the remainder of this paper I show that this way of reading the empirical material available in 
Poland clarifies a number of recent developments in party positioning on EU integration. 
 
2. European integration in Polish party narratives before and after 2004 
 
Let me start with an overview of the narratives on European integration as they have been told in par-
ty programs in the run-up to the five latest parliamentary elections in Poland. Because of its particular signifi-
cance, I have also included the campaigns that political parties organized in the run-up to the 2003 referendum 
on EU accession. What dimension of European integration have parties chosen to focus on when they pre-
sented the matter to their potential voters? The following table shows, for each of these election years, which 
political parties have included which kind of EU-related arguments in their central party program. 
 
Table 1: EU-related arguments in central party programs 
 
Election year  The normative value of European 
integration 
The political practice of European 
integration 
 Parties  arguing 
in support of 
Parties that are 
critical of 
Parties arguing 
in support of 
Parties that are 
critical of 
1993  PSL, UD, UP, KPN   SLD, PSL, UD   UP, Ojczyzna, 
KPN 
1997  UP, Blok dla 
Polski, AWS, UW, 
ROP, UPR, SLD 
  SLD, PSL  Blok dla Polski, 
AWS, PSL 
2001    LPR  SLD, UW, PSL,   PSL, PO, PiS, LPR 
2003  PO, PiS  LPR  PSL, SLD Samoobrona,  PSL, 
PiS, UP 
2005    LPR  SLD  PSL, LPR, PiS 
2007  PO, LiD    PO, LiD  PiS, PSL 
Notes:  
(1) This interpretation is based on my reading of the party programs collected by the Instytut Studiów Politycznych (see 
footnote 2). For the October 2007 election I used the programs as available through the websites of the various parties. 
(2) An alphabetical list of abbreviations is included as an appendix at the end of the paper. 
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Before going further I have to point out that this table can only be a crude indicator of what Polish 
political parties have highlighted in their narratives about European integration. There are a number of impor-
tant caveats. For example, presented here are only those parties that entered into parliament, which, of course, 
is somewhat of a reduction especially for those elections that left a great number of parties outside parliament 
(e.g., in 1993). Moreover, the party material that has been used forms only a part of the entire communication 
that parties have set up with their potential voters. This mapping exercise does not take into account opinions 
voiced by individual politicians during interviews and debates in the public media. Parties that did not express 
any opinion on EU-related matters in their manifestos (e.g. the KPEiR [Alliance of Retirees and Pensioners] in 
1993) were obviously not included, although individual politicians might have had a particular opinion on 
European integration that they perhaps voiced elsewhere. This is also the case for parties that are widely 
known to be critical of the EU. In 2001, Self-Defense (Samoobrona), for example, did not include any nega-
tive statements on the EU in its program, basically because the whole program simply ignored the existence of 
the EU. Moreover, this map says nothing about how radical or how moderate statements about the EU are; it 
only attempts to trace the kinds of arguments that have been made. 
 
All of this taken into account, however, it seems to me that this overview may still catch some impor-
tant trends since it relies on the material that has been approved by parties (and not simply on the personal 
convictions of an individual politician) and gives an idea of where the emphasis lies in the narratives of parties 
that have had some success in elections. Moreover, I am interested not in analyzing all parties here, but mainly 
in contextualizing the EU rhetoric of the more recent centrist parties, both those who are more or less pro-
European such as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the left-wing umbrella group Left and Democrats (LiD) 
and Civic Platform (PO), and those that have become increasingly known as outspoken critics of EU integra-
tion, such as the Solidarity Election Action (AWS, later Solidarity Election Action of the Right, AWSP) and, 
most crucially, Law and Justice (PiS). 
 
Focus on European integration as a norm: a consensus in the 1990s 
 
If one examines the views on European integration in Polish party programs since 1993, one finds 
that throughout the 1990s most major mainstream political parties have emphasized their will to participate in 
the European integration project. Although there is, even as early as 1993, discussion about whether the politi-
cal practice of European integration is ideal and whether Poland should agree with the course taken, there 
seems to be, on a deeper level, agreement on the normative value of European integration. And many parties 
seem to be inclined to highlight this conviction in their party programs. The most pro-European parties in the 
first half of the 1990s argued that Poland needed to become a member of the European Union “as soon as 
possible” (as the Freedom Union [UW] formulated the matter in 1995; Paszkiewicz 1996: 312). Others were 
more hesitant about the timing and the modalities, but still accepted the principle. Parties that sounded critical 
of the process of enlargement and the benefits Poland might have from a closer association with the EU ap-
parently still wanted to emphasize that the underlying principle was good. This preference was usually framed 
as part of a larger argument about the “return” of Poland to Europe after the cold war and the unification of 
the continent. 
 
Poland’s culture and national economy were often portrayed as inextricably bound up with European 
culture and economy. There were almost no parties, and certainly no mainstream parties, that explicitly op-
posed the underlying principle. Variation is to be found here in the degree to which the parties emphasize ei-
ther cultural or economic dimensions. According to the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in 1993, Poland had “the 
particular, moral right to seek [economic] support from the side of Europe” (Skłodowska 2001: 176). The De-
mocratic Union (UD) argued in that year that being part of the European integration process was “the logical 
consequence of our argument that it is our choice to belong to the world of democracy, peace and economic 
progress” (Skłodowska 2001: 297). Other parties linked the normative standpoint with a cultural idea. The 
Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) argued that European accession was an economically useful response to a 
cultural given: “we will help to create the unity of the continent based on the Christian roots of our civiliza-
tion” (Słodkowska and Dołbakowska 2004: 107).  
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Underlying such cultural pronouncements was, of course, hardly hidden, a discourse about geopoli-
tics. Poland’s eagerness to join the EU has been framed in a context that starts from the assumption that a 
Europe that includes the whole of “Eastern” Europe will remain a fiction, because there is still and will be a 
crucial political dividing line between the West and the East of the continent. As Hagen writes “In many re-
spects, the East–West dichotomy has continued to serve as Europe’s dominant geographical paradigm despite 
the end of the Cold War, although important shifts and debates over new lines of demarcation and definition 
are underway” (Hagen 2003: 509). In the 1990s, Polish parties overwhelmingly sought to shift the border of 
Eastern Europe to the East in order to present themselves as part of the West. All main contenders in all the 
parliamentary elections between 1991 and 2001 linked issues of international policy with the allegedly precari-
ous position of Poland between two powerful countries, Germany and Russia. And Polish independence was 
largely seen as “independence from Russia.” In this way, European Union membership was seen as something 
that could guarantee such a form of independence. 
 
All of this did not preclude a certain hesitance about the concrete direction of the European integra-
tion process. The Solidarity Election Action (AWS) argued in 1997 that, in terms of political practice, they pre-
ferred to be part of a Europe that would not be supranational but rather intergovernmental in the Gaullist tra-
dition of “l’Europe des Patries” (“Europa Ojczyzn”) (Słodkowska and Dołbakowska 2004: 107). But the 
dominance of the cultural, economic and geopolitical frame had a strong effect on the position of those par-
ties that sought a more anti-European course. Even rabid nationalists could not formulate a basic objection 
against the European unification project without condemning themselves to the margins of the political spec-
trum. A lot of radical-oriented nationalist parties in the 1990s, therefore, did not formulate a radical anti-EU 
stance. When they formulated criticism of the EU project, they framed those arguments as “euro-realist” argu-
ments or arguments that would not go against the basic assumption that the inclusion of Poland in Europe is 
essentially a good thing (Neumayer 2008: 142). Self-defense (Samoobrona), for example, which would become 
known as the most virulent anti-EU party at the end of the decade, was in the first half of the 1990s still mak-
ing proposals based on the viewpoint that, as the party formulated it, there is “a valid need for European 
integration” (Paszkiewicz 1996: 91). 
 
Also, when nationalist arguments were used to oppose to the arguments of the pro-market reform 
parties in Poland, they did not contain strong overtones of anti-Europeanism. When the Confederation of an 
Independent Poland (KPN) in the elections of 1993 issued an attack on the Balcerowicz shock-therapy privati-
zation policy, it did so within a nationalist framework. Its program material promised to effectuate “the re-
placement of the currently implemented anti-national and anti-Polish economic model of the Balcerowicz 
plan.” At the same time, such a “nationalization” of economic reform did not lead the party to disengage from 
European economic reforms. In its 1992 program, the party argued that “Poland, as a country between East 
and West, has weighty obligations in the new organizations of our region and in helping to create a unified 
Europe of nations from the Atlantic to the Asian Sea” (Paszkiewicz 1996: 53).  
 
Focus on the practice of integration in the run-up to the accession and after 2004 
 
When EU membership became a tangible and realistic political goal for Poland, political mobilizers 
became less reticent about their criticism of the European integration process. In contrast to earlier periods, 
there were now important radical parties that did not shy away from framing their own view as being against 
European unification in principle. Moreover, centrist parties that were critical of certain elements in the practice 
of the European integration process did not emphasize as much the fact that they were still supporting the 
normative validity of the European integration project. 
 
Among center-oriented parties, this new self-assured and openly self-reflective anti-EU discourse now 
became mainly the hallmark of the post-Solidarity political groupings that had formed the main partner of the 
1997 government. They were never a real threat to the EU accession process. Solidarity Election Action (AWS) 
was a grouping of parties that had been able to cooperate in order to defeat the Social Democrats of the SLD, 
but in reality it remained a rather unruly political association that, after three years of tension with its coalition 
partner in government, the more progressive and pro-Europe oriented Freedom Union (UW), saw itself 
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forced to lead a minority government until the elections of 2001. In the run-up to these elections, several par-
ties quit the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and formed new coalitions and alliances. Among one of those 
new conservative political forces was Law and Justice (PiS) of the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, 
who tried to profit from their image as “owners” of the “real” heritage of the Solidarity movement as well as 
their reputation of being strict on justice matters and moral issues. 
 
The 2001 program documents of Law and Justice (PiS) reveal a perceptible change in the centrist dis-
course on EU membership. Although the party admitted that it did not seek to withdraw from the process, it 
did voice, more than any centrist party before it, severe criticism of the way in which the negotiations were led 
and, quite significantly, it suggested that membership was not supported by the population and therefore 
could produce “fatal” consequences: 
 
Today, our accession to the EU poses an immense problem. Precisely this goal, of all the 
matters that we have to undertake in the international arena, is the most important as well as the 
most controversial one. The decision to enter the Union must be a decision taken by the people 
in a referendum. In order to make that referendum meaningful, the Poles have to be presented a 
credible document that describes all the side effects of entering the Union, both the gains and 
the losses. Without such a document the decision will be taken blindly, and later, when there will 
be difficulties, it may be questioned by the majority, with all the ensuing fatal consequences. 
(Słodkowska 2002: 94-95) 
 
These were the words of warning issued by a party that considered itself to be in the conservative 
mainstream of the political spectrum. If this position is not directly anti-EU, it did create the possibility of be-
coming associated with parties that were more outspoken in their fundamental criticism of European integra-
tion, such as the League of Polish Families (LPR). The League of Polish Families, which registered as a new 
party in April 2001 and gathered several radically conservative groups, argued in its first official election 
material the following:  
 
We stand today before this question: will we realize Polish programs or also programs that 
are foreign to Poland? In consequence – will we have work, and will we eat Polish bread, and will 
we live in a Polish house? Or will we also, in the context of the European Union or another con-
temporary tower of Babel, import unemployment, eat foreign bread and live on the streets? We 
choose for an independent and sovereign Poland. (Słodkowska 2002: 243) 
 
In this quote, the League of Polish Families (LPR) used the metaphors of the Babel tower and the Pol-
ish bread in order to reinforce the old theme of the Polish independence struggle. In the 1990s “indepen-
dence” meant “free from Russia” and accession to the EU was seen as a way to guarantee this freedom. In the 
above quote, EU membership is portrayed as a threat to Polish independence. A bleak view of the job market 
and the economy is invoked within this frame without it being connected to any discussion about the reality of 
the European economy. The party argues that EU membership entails a crucial loss for Poland, and it finds it 
unnecessary to provide any evidence for the claim that accession will make unemployment soar. 
 
Parties that were aiming more at a mainstream electorate, such as Law and Justice, did not go as far as 
LPR in its condemnation of the European integration project, but the possibility for some sort of connection 
between the two parties on this level was not excluded. Law and Justice remained silent enough on whether 
they condemned the EU in principle that they made an association thinkable with those who did condemn it. 
 
All of this points, it seems to me, to the increasing strategic utility of being critical of the European in-
tegration project. A party like Law and Justice (PiS) could deemphasize its deeper belief in the value of Euro-
pean integration and try to capture that part of the electorate that was represented by the fundamental anti-
Europeans of the League of Polish Families (LPR). There are a number of specific circumstances that made 
anti-EU arguments specifically useful for Law and Justice (PiS) in the period between 2001 and 2005. 
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First, the party’s turn to EU criticism came right at the moment of a failed conservative government 
and at the eve of the successful return of the post-communist social democrats to power. The pro-European 
SLD won the elections of 2001 overwhelmingly. Their candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski had already won the 
presidency a year earlier. And it was the prime minister of an SLD-led government, Leszek Miller, who nego-
tiated Poland’s accession into the EU at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Since the SLD had nego-
tiated the accession, all the opposition’s rhetorical energy could go to the idea that the deal was badly negoti-
ated. Since the basic decision about membership had been taken, moderate parties gained a position in which 
they more safely and more confidently could go into the direction of radical Euroskepticism. There was for 
anti-SLD opposition parties no need at that point anymore to be careful with criticism or to conceal it as 
“Euro-realism”. Since the SLD had already secured membership for Poland, the costs for voicing EU-critical 
remarks would not be that a loss of membership. The normative argumentation, linked with a cultural, geo-
political or economic “return to Europe” stance, was abandoned by almost all moderate parties and a more 
pragmatic discussion about the positive and negative sides of this particular EU-accession deal emerged.  
 
Second, the connection between anti-EU rhetoric and anti-SLD opposition was reinforced by the fact 
that the SLD’s record on domestic and foreign policy proved to be largely unsuccessful. Although the govern-
ment had successfully negotiated the country’s accession to the EU, it could not remedy problems of unem-
ployment (in 2002, the domestic unemployment rate rose to 18.1 percent) (Towalski 2003). Moreover, in the 
course of 2002 and 2003, SLD politicians were increasingly mentioned in the context of bribery scandals, a fact 
that severely marred the reputation and the popular base of the party. One important case, soon known as the 
“Rywin affair,” reached newspaper headlines as early as 2003.4 Moreover, the position of prime minister Les-
zek Miller was damaged because of his implication in another infamous scandal, the Orlen affair.5 These scan-
dals soon came to symbolize the downfall of the entire left in Poland. 
 
All of this played a significant role in the June 2003 referendum for EU accession, which was held in 
circumstances in which almost all opposition parties in parliament voiced some form of criticism of the mem-
bership process. Apart from the main governing party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), only the pro-
business Civic Platform (PO) mobilized in favor of accession. 
 
On May 2, 2004, just one day after Poland’s accession to the EU, Leszek Miller resigned from his 
position as prime minister, opening the way for what would be a one-year SLD-led government under the pre-
miership of Marek Belka, an ex-finance minister whose candidacy even within the SLD was seen as controver-
sial and certainly among the group of former SLD politicians who had established a new party called Socjal-
demokracja Polska (Polish Social Democracy, SdPl). The poor result of the SdPl in the elections for the Euro-
pean parliament in June 2004, however, made SdPl deputies continue to support the SLD-led cabinet for the 
time being in order to avoid downright defeat in early Sejm elections. When, in the autumn of 2005, Sejm 
elections were eventually held, they did, as expected, turn into a disaster for the SLD as well as the SdPl. 
 
 
                                                 
4In December 2002, Lew Rywin, a film producer, had approached the company Agora, the publisher of Poland’s liberal 
newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and, suggesting that he represented people well-placed in government, requested a bribe in re-
turn for pushing through adjustments in a draft bill on electronic media that would be favorable to the publisher. The 
parliamentary commission set up to investigate this affair over the course of 2003 revealed an image of the SLD as “arro-
gant, cynical and morally corrupt” (Kochanowicz 2007: 8) and led to a division in the party. Politicians from the SLD es-
tablishment were also named in corruption scandals about money laundering in the gambling industry and involvement in 
organized crime (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2003). 
5Miller was accused of having arranged, in 2002, the dismissal of the chief executive of the oil refiner and petroleum re-
tailer PKN Orlen (Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen), one of Poland’s largest companies. According to a former state treas-
ury minister in the government, Miller had sought to replace the dismissed CEO with someone favorable to the govern-
ment (Dudek 2005: 470). In this case, too, a special parliamentary investigation commission was set up. The commission 
energetically examined corruption allegations and unearthed dubious connections between politics, industry and the se-
cret services; but it also created a forum for politically inspired accusations and counteraccusations (Jasiewicz and 
Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2004: 1153). 
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European integration, party competition and nationalist mobilization 
 
What is the relationship between EU criticism and nationalism in Poland? As I have shown, there is 
no intrinsic link between the two phenomena. In the 1990s there were political actors who argued that EU 
membership was to serve as a guarantee for independence, which is, of course, the ultimate nationalist con-
cern. In the 2000s, however, a number of developments reinforced the connection between nationalism and 
euro-critical political stances. 
 
  One element in this is the continuing lack of clarity about what constitutes the “left” and what the 
“right.” Since 2001, Law and Justice (PiS), which combines ideas that can be seen as left- and right-wing, has 
attempted to make another political division more central to the debate. During the 2005 campaign it was 
clear that the focus of competition would be between two post-Solidarność groups, the Law and Justice party 
(PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO). In order to highlight the differences between these two catch-all parties, 
Law and Justice (PiS) made the choice to frame its own policy preferences as matters of “national interest.” It 
did so in the first place by reframing its stance against the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The party did not 
simply argue that the implosion of the SLDwas caused by corruption in that party, it also argued that corrup-
tion was a symptom of a wider problem: the refusal to break with the communist past and the refusal to de-
fend the Polish nation against foreign (Russian) interests. Law and Justice reframed its protest against corrup-
tion as a fundamental criticism of all self-described left-wing politics. The party argued that corruption illus-
trated the theory that the Polish left-wing politicians were still deeply implicated in a well-defined network of 
people with roots in the communist establishment. 
 
  In an interview conducted in April 2004, Jarosław Kaczyński offered a succinct demonstration of how 
anti-corruption, opposition against left-wing political parties, ideological conservatism, and national belonging 
could be discursively constructed as deeply intertwined phenomena. When asked whether without Law and 
Justice the battle against corruption would become impossible Lech Kaczyński answered: 
 
Not only the battle with corruption. It is about the destruction of countless pathological 
power structures, and also about deep state reform, which encompasses ideological and moral 
foundations. One also has to reveal the entire evilness of the last fifteen years; one has to refer, 
in the process of building a new state, not to abstractions, but to the real, increasingly mal-
functioning moral and ideological convictions among Poles, particularly convictions related to 
feelings of national belonging. (Kurksi 2004) 
 
By constructing a tight association between the narrative of anti-corruption and the promotion of 
“national” values, the Law and Justice (PiS) campaign effectively accused left-wing politicians of national be-
trayal. Their adherence to the left was simply interpreted as a service to foreign powers. This Manichaean con-
ception of the political reality was reinforced by insinuating sentences in the program documents, such as: 
“The Poles have the right to know who served Moscow, and who fought for an independent Fatherland. Who 
was an executioner, and who was a victim” (PiS program 2005: 18). 
 
  Another element that reinforces the connection between nationalism and EU criticism are the at-
tempts of centrists and radical politicians to “nationalize” moral issues. Any development coming from out-
side Poland was framed as potentially threatening to the traditional moral order of Poland. Underlying the mo-
bilization campaigns of Law and Justice (PiS) was a political understanding of the Polish nation that reduced it 
to a morally homogenous nation under the constant threat of anti-Polish, anti-religious and, therefore, im-
moral enemies. Mainly through its close association with Radio Maryja during the 2005 campaign and its for-
mation of a government with the League of Polish Families (LPR) a year later, PiS suggested that it endorsed a 
discourse that amounted to, as Brian Porter’s poignant phrase about another historical era goes, a nationalism 
that “hates” (Porter 2002). Since the League of Polish Families (LPR) was built on political traditions deeply 
rooted in a politics of blaming a “nationalized” other (in particular the Jews), the whole government’s conser-
vative plank (in fields ranging from women’s rights to bioethics) could be seen as “nationalist,” and was in-
deed as such presented by the government parties themselves. 
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  In sum, the debate on political positions on the EU integration process has been conflated with a dis-
cussion of what it means to be the “true” representative of the Polish nation and the Polish traditional moral 
order. Such invocations of the nation have been used in order to carve out particular positions in ethical de-
bates (gay rights, euthanasia, abortion) as well as in the areas of how to deal with the communist past (lustra-
tion) and with economic reform. 
 
When political elites now argue for or against European integration, they deploy competing narratives 
about the meaning of EU membership. For certain parties, EU membership is actively framed as related to 
current threats to traditional values. For others it represents an opportunity to break with the political and cul-
tural traditions of the Soviet era. 
 
The fact that EU criticism was “nationalized” is clear, for example, from the fact that, during the dis-
cussion about the EU accession negotiation, the opposition parties mostly criticized the question of land own-
ership. Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2003:1052) point out that, although the topic was of secondary im-
portance for the EU, Polish parties questioning the accession agreement put strong emphasis on the topic of 
the right of foreign individuals and companies to purchase land in Poland. Political mobilizers argued that the 
current deal would open the door to Germans who would be interested in buying land from the territories in 
the west of the country that had been “regained” from Germany after the Second World War.  
 
The response of the pro-European neo-liberal, pro-business party Civic Platform (PO) to this type of 
conflation of EU criticism with moral order arguments came somewhat belatedly. In 2001, Civic Platform 
(PO) had still based its campaign on the idea that the normative consensus on the principle of EU integration 
did not need to be made explicit, since it seemed that this consensus was still largely in place. In the most re-
cent election campaign of 2007, Civic Platform opted for a more explicit and offensive defense of the principle 
of European integration. It highlighted the idea that the Polish nation had always been part of European civi-
lization and that Law and Justice (PiS) had done nothing but distance Poland from that cultural zone. In this 
more offensive pro-EU position, the narrative was clearly a response to the anti-European nationalist framings 
of Law and Justice (PiS). Civic Platform added that EU membership had to be defended in order to protect 
the material well-being of the nation and to improve the international standing of the country. This presented 
an attempt to reconnect pro-EU arguments with Polish nationalism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the political uses of EU-related arguments in Polish domestic politics since 
the beginning of the 1990s and finds that the EU critical positions that do not seem socially rooted or popular 
in electoral terms are comprehensible when seen in the context of the rhetoric of action and reaction between 
political parties. The paper has shown that domestic views on European integration in Poland are to be under-
stood as the expression of a changing balance between a deeply held conviction and a strategic position related 
to the context of domestic political competition. Since 2001, centrist political actors have mainly used anti-EU 
rhetoric to serve purposes that relate to the domain of domestic political competition. They could deempha-
size their deep normative commitment to European integration because EU membership had already been 
secured. Finally, I have shown how domestic political competitors in Poland have intentionally conflated pro- 
and anti-EU rhetoric with a discussion on commitments to the “truthful” representation of the nation. 
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Annex 1: Political parties – abbreviations, full name and translation 
 
AWS   Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Election Action) 
Blok dla Polski  (Bloc for Poland) 
KPN Konfederacja  Polski  Niepodległej (Confederation for an Independent   Poland) 
LiD  Lewica i  Democraci (Left and Democrats) 
LPR  Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) 
Ojczyzna  Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy “Ojczyzna” (Catholic Election Committee “Fatherland”)
PiS  Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 
PO  Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) 
PSL   Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party) 
ROP   Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction) 
Samoobrona  Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland) 
SLD  Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) 
UD   Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) 
UP   Unia Pracy (Labor Union) 
 